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INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Declaration of Independence, the death
of Abraham Lincoln, Elvis’ final concert, and the invention of
the light bulb;

All of these events and dozens of others that

changed history have at least one common element – they happened
indoors, inside historic American interiors.
The need to preserve artifact of civilization has made
itself felt since at least as far back as the Roman Empire;
Emperor Majorian, circa 453 A.D. “was anxious to protect
monuments of those ages in which he would have desired and
deserved to live.” 1

Like their Roman counterpart, American

leaders keenly felt this need for safeguarding the architectural
record of the past.

Americans enacted the first local

legislation protecting historically or architecturally
significant private property in Charleston, South Carolina in
1931. 2
Since these first efforts to introduce protection for
important historic structures into the legal canon, the volume
and scope of historic preservation law has grown enormously.

In

1972, the United States Preservation Commission Identification

1

Scott H. Rothstein, Takings Jurisprudence Comes in From the Cold: Preserving
Interiors Through Landmark Designation, 26 Conn. 1105, 1108 (FN2)(1994).
2
Id. at 1108.
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Project identified 492 local historic preservation commissions. 3
Five years later in 1981, that number had nearly doubled to 832. 4
By 1998, the last year for which data is available, the number
had exploded to 2 368 historic preservation commissions
nationwide. 5

The Rise of Interior Preservation

Concomitantly with the proliferation of historic
preservation commissions, the authority of these commissions to
regulate more than mere exterior features also grew.

This

authority expanded, notably, into interior landmarking.
In 1988, the City of Boston Law Department published an
update of a survey that had previously been conducted by the
National Center for Preservation Law. 6

The Center had surveyed

465 local landmark commissions, of which 139 responded. 7

Of

these 139, only 22 believed they had authority to landmark
interiors. 8

Just 11 said they had made such designations already

3

Connie Malone and Pratt Cassity, The United States Preservation Commission
Identification Project, available at
http://www.uga.edu/sed/pso/programs/napc/pdfs/uspcip94.pdf (1994).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Albert H. Manwaring, American Heritage at Stake: The Government’s Vital
Interest in Interior Landmark Designations, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 291, 293
(FN11)(1990).
7
Id.
8
Id.

2

Johnathan Lloyd, Historic Preservation, Tersh Boasberg

or were otherwise regulating interiors. 9

This survey represents

a cross-section of the burgeoning development of interior
preservation in the late 1980s.
Regarding the developing case law in this early period of
interior preservation, an article in the Fall 1990 issue of the
New England Law Review noted the following:
The battle between property owners and historic
preservationists recently moved to the interiors of
our significant buildings. Thus far, only three cases
have challenged the police power authority of state
and local governments to protect building interiors
under landmark laws. But with the increasing tendency
of municipal governments to designate and regulate
building interiors as landmarks, there will be many
more challenges to this authority in the future. 10
During the late 1980s, and certainly by 1990, it must have
seemed that interior preservation was at least one of the facets
of historic preservation that was just beginning to make a name
for itself.

9
10

Id.
Id. at 317,318.
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Interior Preservation Now

So where has interior preservation law gone since 1990?
Did the New England Law Journal article correctly predict a long
and colorful life for interior preservation, full of litigation,
constitutional challenges, commentary, scholarship…?
The history of historic preservation law is somewhat
difficult to reconstruct.

However, certain sources do offer a

glimpse of the major events that mark this history:
o The article from the New England Law Journal cited above
refers to two cases that had already dealt with interior
preservation: Weinberg v. Barry (1986), and Sameric Corp.
v. City of Philadelphia (1989). 11
o A 1994 article from the Connecticut Law Review cites two
of the three interior preservation cases mentioned above,
plus two others: Shubert Organization v. Landmarks
Preservation Commission (1991), and Teachers Insurance &
Annuity Ass’n of America v. City of New York (1992). 12
o The Fall 1994 issue of Urban Lawyer cites the conclusion
of Sameric Corp. in it’s article titled “Recent
Developments in Historic Preservation and Architectural

11
12

Id. at 318.
Manwaring, supra note 6, at 122, 123.
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Control Law.” 13

This is the only case it cites related to

interior preservation.

This is also the last time a case

dealing directly with interior preservation was mentioned
in Urban Lawyer’s “Recent Developments.”
o The 2002 issue of the Widener Law Symposium Journal
publishes an article entitled, “Avoiding the ‘Disneyland
Façade’: The Reach of Architectural Controls Exercised by
Historic Districts Over Internal Features of
Structures.” 14

The article cites no interior preservation

cases not mentioned above. 15
o American Land Planning Law Database, § 75:13 Designation
of landmark interiors cites to two cases mentioned
already. 16

The database’s most recent update was in July

2007. 17
o Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 19:17
Interiors cites three cases mentioned already. 18

13

The

Bradford J. White, Recent Developments in Historic Preservation and
Architectural Control Law, 26 Urb. Law. 777 at 777.
14
Robert W. Mallard, Avoiding the “Disneyland Façade”: The Reach of
Architectural Controls Exercised by Historic Districts Over Internal Features
of Structures, 8 Widener L. Symp. J. 323 at 324.
15
In 2002, Mallard writes, “while preserving the exterior of homes in historic
districts is commonplace, most states do not include interiors in their
preservation-enabling legislation.” Id. Is this more evidence of neglect of
historic preservation?
16
Norman Williams, Jr. and John M. Taylor, American Land Planning Law
Database, § 75:13 (Rev. Ed.) (2007).
17
Id.
18
Edward H. Zeigler, Jr., Arden H. Rathkopf, and Daren A. Rathkopf,
Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 19:17 (4th Ed.) (2008).
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database was updated in April 2008, although this section
was last updated in June 1997. 19
It appears not only that the academic treatment of interior
preservation has been spare at best, but also that
a mere handful of cases spanning less than a decade is all there
is to show for the copious jurisprudence predicted in 1990.
What has sealed the case law on interior preservation
against constitutional attack?

What about these landmark cases

has made interior preservation almost unquestionably
constitutional?

This paper examines takings and due process challenges in
the leading cases that galvanized the constitutionality of
interior preservation. These cases together form the shield that
protects interior designations from constitutional attack.

This

paper’s goal is to distill the critical points that have left
the jurisprudence on interior preservation all but bare for much
more than a decade.

THE CASE LAW

A legal genealogist tracing the lineage of interior
preservation law finds his Adam in Penn Central. 20
19

Id.

6

Lawyers and
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legal scholars have no trouble recognizing this case as a
watershed in the field of historic preservation.

Better known,

certainly, for its contributions in the realm of exterior
preservation law, the case has no less significance in the
province of interior preservation.

Penn Central (1978)

Exterior and interior of Grand Central Station

Grand Central Terminal is a French Beaux Arts rail terminal
at the intersection of 42nd Street and Park Avenue in New York
City. 21

The building was opened in 1913. 22

The terminal was

owned by Penn Central Transportation Corporation (Penn Central),
who was also the proprietor of a number of other important
properties in Midtown Manhattan. 23

New York’s Landmarks

Preservation Commission (Commission) designated Grand Central

20
21
22
23

Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
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Terminal a “landmark” in August of 1967. 24

The following month,

the Board of Estimate (the Board) confirmed the designation, as
prescribed by New York City’s Landmark Preservation Law. 25
Although Penn Central opposed the landmark designation
before the Board, it failed to take advantage of its right to
judicial review of the decision. 26
The year after the designation, Penn Central leased the
airspace above the train terminal to UPG Properties. 27

The terms

of the lease called for the construction of a multistory office
building above the station. 28

Renowned Hungarian architect

Marcel Breuer prepared two proposals for the design of the new
addition. 29

Owing to the new landmark designation, Penn Central

and UPG were forced to seek approval of the plans from the
Commission. 30

The Commission rejected both proposals as

incompatible with the historic design of the terminal, denying
the necessary certificate of no exterior effect and certificate
of appropriateness. 31
Penn Central filed suit in the New York Supreme Court. 32
After winning here, the Appellate Division reversed, and Penn

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. The agreement was made on January 22, 1968.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
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Central appealed. 33
affirmed. 34

The New York State Court of Appeals

The case finally came before the United States

Supreme Court. 35
Penn Central alleged that New York’s Landmark Preservation
Law, by denying their proposal to build the new addition to the
terminal, wrought a taking without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 36

In an opinion by Justice

Brennan, the court held that three factors are particularly
relevant to courts’ consideration in deciding cases alleging
takings: 37
1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the
[owner]”;
2) “the extent to which the regulation had interfered
with distinct investment backed expectations"; and
3) “the character of the governmental action.” 38
Although the specific facts of this case do not touch on
interior landmarking, every case that does cites to its opinion.
What is it about this decision that makes it such a boon to
interior preservation?
As a preliminary matter, it seems clear that this case has
had the fortunate effect of giving the constitutional go-ahead
to municipalities to create their own historic preservation
ordinances.
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1975.
at 120.
at 122.

As historic designation became more widespread, the

1977.
Argued April 17, 1978.

at 124.
at 124.
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pressure to begin protecting historic interiors as well as
exteriors certainly mounted as well.

It may be thanks to this

mounting pressure and the efforts by local landmarking
commissions to relieve it that the subsequent cases came along
at all.
Regarding specific protections against takings challenges,
this case first makes it absolutely clear that mere diminution
of value does to constitute a taking. 39

This one principle alone

appears again and again in the subsequent interior designation
cases, and its impact can hardly be overestimated.

39

Id. at 105.
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Weinberg v. Barry (1986)

Exterior and screen room of the Warner Building

A takings challenge was again the central issue in Weinberg
v. Barry. 40

The property that is the central object of this case

is the Warner Building in downtown Washington, D.C. 41

The City

designated a portion of the building’s exterior and a portion of
the building’s interior, a theater, as an historic landmark. 42
Plaintiff brought suit against the Mayor of the District of
Columbia, claiming that the D.C. ordinance allowing for the
designation of building interiors was facially unconstitutional

40
41
42

Weinberg v. Barry, 634 F.Supp. 86 (1986).
Id. at 87.
Id.
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and effected a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. 43
Then as now, the only reference to interior designation in
the D.C. historic preservation statute occurs in the definitions
section:

Under the statute, “alter” or “alteration” includes

any “change in any interior space that has been specifically
designated as an historic landmark.” 44

Interestingly, however,

plaintiffs did not contend that this fleeting reference to
interior designations was insufficient to give the Commission
authority to make them.

Nor has this authority of the D.C.

Historic Preservation Commission under the statute ever been
called into question before the court.
Plaintiffs argued that a private interior space, such as
the theater of the Warner building, could only be a benefit to
the public if it were forcibly opened for public viewing. 45
Forcing the building open would produce an invasion of private
property impermissible under Loretto, and rob owners of the
profitable uses of their own property. 46

Thus no law providing

for the designation of interiors as historic landmarks could
possibly pass constitutional muster. 47

43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 92.
D.C. St. 6-1102(1)(b).
Weinberg, 634 F.Supp. at 93.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Weinberg, 634 F. Supp. at 92.
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The Court firmly rejected plaintiff’s argument that that
interior designation only serves the public interest if the
government requires public access to the building. 48

The Court

noted first that the stated purposes of the D.C. preservation
act include much more than visual enjoyment, citing the economic
benefits of attracting visitors to the city. 49
But even if the public interest required that the public be
allowed to see the interior firsthand, as the plaintiff argued,
the court found that the interior designation would still not
affect a taking. 50

Nor did the Court find that it would be

necessary to mandate the opening of the building to the public
in violation of the private property rights of the owner. 51
Many, if not most or all of the economically viable uses for
this and other historic interiors depend upon the owner
voluntarily inviting the public inside. 52

Restaurants, retail

shops, hotels and theaters (as in this case) all give the public
access to their interiors without the need for government
directive.
Readers should note that although the court did not
incorporate them into its opinion, the purposes of the D.C. Act
offer perhaps more possibilities for rationalizing the

48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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protection of historic interiors regardless of the public’s
access to them. 53
The D.C. Act states among its purposes, “to safeguard the
city’s cultural, social, economic, political and architectural
heritage.” 54

D.C.’s Historic Preservation Review Board will

still accomplish this purpose if it designates as landmarks
historic interiors that have no prospect whatever of ever being
open to the public.

This is, in fact, the logical conclusion of

the reasoning employed some years after Weinberg by the Sameric
court.

It held that even if an interior were completely closed

to the public, the legitimate purposes of historic landmark
designation might well be upheld, if only to preserve the space
with the prospect that some future owner might make a more
public use of it. 55
One might even argue that designating interiors to which
the public has no access more effectively “safeguard[s] the
city’s cultural, social, economic, political and architectural
heritage,” than designating those into which the touching,
prying, trampling hoi polloi regularly intrude.

53

See Sass Silver, Not Brick by Brick: Development of Interior Landmark
Designation
Policies in Washington, D.C. (2002),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=georgetown/hpp
s (Further discussing interior preservation in D.C.)
54
D.C. St. § 6-1101(a)(2).
55
Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 558 A.2d 155, 158 (1989).
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By upholding this and other purposes of the D.C. Act as
Constitutionally valid, the court leaves the door wide open to
arguments like this one that, though they greatly enhance the
likelihood that historic interiors will gain legal protection,
also greatly attenuate the public’s link to benefits professedly
“in the public interest.”
While this result is perhaps undesirable as a policy
matter, it does make defending interior preservation all the
easier.

By allowing the attenuation of the link to the public

interest, the court greatly reduces the realm of what
constitutes a taking without just compensation.

Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia (1989)

A screen room and the lobby of the Boyd Theater

Sameric proposed essentially the same argument against
landmarking Philadelphia’s Boyd Theater that Weinberg had used
to oppose landmarking the Warner Building theater in D.C. some

15
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years earlier. 56

Sameric argued that the landmark designation of

the theater was inappropriate as the public could gain no
benefit from a private interior. 57

Having poached a dead

argument, Sameric might have anticipated the court’s reasoning
in rejecting it: Quoting Weinberg, the court held that “numerous
conceivable private uses of the interiors of buildings which are
compatible with public viewing of the area.” 58
After thus dispensing with Sameric’s arguments, the court
took the unusual step of drawing out the logical conclusions of
its reasoning.

It noted, as discussed above, that if preserving

historic resources is itself an acceptable public purpose,
justifying the use of the police power, public viewing of these
interiors (or any viewing at all!) becomes superfluous. 59
The Sameric court uses the conservative side of this
reasoning to make the point that the government must preserve
landmark interiors with the outlook that some future use may
well give the public access. 60

In the court’s own words, “the

Commonwealth must execute a farsightedness which, at times will
necessarily transcend private interests.” 61 This is the inverted
version of Teacher Insurance and Annuity Association’s (TIAA)
argument, discussed infra and rejected by that court, that
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 157, 158.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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because its restaurant might some day be converted into a wholly
private space, landmark designation should be withheld. 62

Here

the argument is that because some day the protected interior
might become public, landmark preservation should be allowed. 63
Though this court’s reasoning was more tempered, might one
cite Sameric as pointing to the proposition that the government
would serve the public interest by landmarking interiors that
never have been and are never likely to be open to the public?

Shubert Organization (1991)

In the mid-1980s, the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission undertook a project of designation for historic
Broadway theaters. 64

The project eventually culminated in the

designation of 28 theaters. 65

Only two of the theaters’

interiors were not designated landmarks. 66

Petitioners brought

suit claiming that the method of designation of landmarks
outlined by the Preservation Statute affected a per se violation
of the Takings Clause. 67

62

Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. City of New York, 82 N.Y.2d 35,
43 (1993).
63
Sameric, 558 A.2d at 158.
64
Shubert Org. Inc. v. Landmarks Pres. Comm’n, 570 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (1991).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 505.
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The court held that Penn Central controlled under the facts
of the case. 68

Since the Supreme Court in that case had already

found New York’s Preservation statute constitutionally sound,
the court saw no need to reason further. 69
On the petitioner’s claim that the statute produced a
taking as applied, the court likewise found no merit. 70
Petitioners had failed to meet their burden of showing that the
designation of the 28 theaters in question deprived them of
“essential use of their property.” 71
Interestingly, petitioners in this case also raised in
support of their claims of constitutional violation, the
argument that the landmark designation of the theaters was a
pretext for protecting the theater industry. 72

Landmarking for

this purpose was impermissible under the New York City
Administrative Code.

The Code expressly forbad the Commission

from using its authority “to regulate and restrict the locations
of trades and industries or location of buildings designed for
specific uses.” 73
From one point of view, it looks as though the actions of
the New York City Commission fall neatly into the category of
proscribed conduct; it was, after all, attempting to landmark 28
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507.
N.Y.C. Admin. Code §

25-304(a).
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theaters within only a few block of one another.

This might

certainly have been seen as “regulat[ing…the] location of
buildings designed for specific uses.”
The Shubert court deftly overcame this allegation of
improper use of authority, however.

It stated:

Although manipulation of the landmarks law for the
purpose of preserving the Broadway theatre industry,
rather than individual theatres, would have been
improper, the designation proceedings addressed the
specific buildings in terms of the criteria of the
law. Accordingly, the administrative determination was
based on substantial evidence, was not arbitrary and
capricious, and did not violate the law. 74
The Teachers Insurance court (whose decision is discussed
infra) would later cite this judgment as making the New York
City Administrative Code provision tantamount to “a prohibition
against the use of landmark designations for zoning purposes.” 75
Thus the actions of the Preservation Commission may
permissibly bear a very strong resemblance to zoning, as they
did in this case.

It appears that the Commission may designate

as many buildings used for a single purpose in as small an area
as it likes.

The Commission need only ensure that each

individual building meets the legal criteria for designation,
and it will screen its action against attack.
Perhaps this case’s greatest contribution to the armor that
protects interior preservation came out of its citation to Penn
74
75

Shubert, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 44.
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Central. 76

That case, as we have already mentioned, had nothing

to do with interior preservation.

However, when the Shubert

court cited to it in support of interior designation against a
per se takings challenge in this case, later courts (Teachers
Insurance, to be specific) came to interpret the citation as
extending the Penn Central doctrine to interior designation. 77

Lucas v. South Carolina (1992)

Lucas’ 2 lots on either side of the house in the center

Lucas’ connection to the field of historic preservation may
seem somewhat attenuated.
76
77

Although the case’s facts originate

Shubert, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
Teachers Ins., 586 N.Y.S.2d at 263 (1992).
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at the birthplace of American historic preservation law, near
Charleston, South Carolina, the case itself has nothing to do
with historic preservation. 78

The Lucas decision, however,

serves as a much-needed sequel to the oblique takings doctrine
of Penn Central.
The facts are as follows: Lucas bought two lots of
residential beachfront property where he planned to build
single-family homes. 79

Two years after this purchase, South

Carolina’s state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management
Act, which aimed to prevent the dangerous effects of erosion on
beachfront property. 80
Lucas brought suit against the Coastal Council alleging
that the new State statute effected a taking as applied to his
case. 81

The statute, which placed Lucas’ property in a zone

where new construction was forbidden, effectively rendered his
two formerly valuable beachfront lots valueless. 82
Prior to coming before the United States Supreme Court, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Beachfront Management
Act had no Constitutional flaw. 83

Relying on U.S. Supreme Court

precedent, the court held that the statute properly addressed
itself to the regulation of “harmful or noxious uses,” and that
78
79
80
81
82
83

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1008.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id. at 1010.
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in such cases no compensation was required, regardless of the
statute’s effect on property value. 84
The U.S. Supreme Court found that its own doctrine on
“harmful or noxious uses” did not apply to the facts of Lucas. 85
Instead, the Court held that any regulation that affects a onehundred percent diminution in the value of real property is
compensable as a taking. 86

The principle holds, said the Court,

regardless of the public interest advanced by such a
regulation. 87
Like Penn Central, this case has, ostensibly, no nexus to
interior preservation.

Also like Penn Central, however, its

application is integral to a complete understanding of the
protections surrounding interior preservation.
In one sense, this case is one of a very few that opens the
door, albeit only slightly, to takings claims.

The case does

stand for the proposition that a one hundred percent diminution
in value will constitute a taking and is compensable.
In another sense, however, this case can be seen as
creating a very strict definition of what will in fact
constitute a taking requiring compensation.

Before Lucas,

courts were aware that there was a nebulous boundary between
permissible zoning and landmarking and impermissible takings.
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id. at 1031.
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Not having a precise standard may have caused courts to err on
the side of safety, compensating for more actions than would
later prove compensable under the one hundred percent standard
articulated in Lucas. 88
Richard Lazarus, of Georgetown University Law Center,
arrives at precisely that conclusion:

Although many view Lucas

as a boon to private property rights advocates, Scalia’s per se
rule in the Lucas opinion has made showing a taking more and not
less difficult.

Lazarus puts it this way:

The property rights movement had, in effect, been
seduced by Scalia’s rhetoric in Lucas and sought to
squeeze all of their takings claims into the Lucas
rubric. But […] courts routinely concluded that
economic value remained and therefore Lucas did not
apply. […]
There have literally been hundreds of
cases since Lucas in which courts had maintained a
Lucas taking. But in more than fifteen years of
litigation, there are only a handful of cases in
either federal or state court, fewer than ten, in
which courts have in fact relied on Lucas in
concluding that a taking in fact occurred. 89
Indeed, a Penn Central takings analysis, while still a high bar,
offered those seeking to style interior designations as
“takings” a fairer prospect than they now face in the wake of
Lucas.

88

Lazarus, Richard, Lucas Unspun, 16 Southeastern Envt’l L. J. Issue #1
(2007), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lazarus/docs/publications/Lazarus_Lucas
_Unspun_Forthcoming2007.pdf
89
Id.
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Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. New
York (1992)

The Seagram Building with interior views of the Four Seasons restaurant

The property at issue in this case was the interior of the
Four Seasons restaurant in the Seagram Building in New York

24
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City. 90

The building itself as well as the restaurant are

executed in the International Style. 91

The building is the only

example of the work of celebrated Bauhaus architect Ludwig Mies
van der Rohe in New York City. 92

The restaurant, whose interior

decoration is the work of American designer Philip Johnson, has
remained architecturally unchanged since it opened in 1959. 93
The restaurant’s design has known much praise – one New York
Times article called it “one of the finest restaurant interiors
ever made anywhere, in any era.” 94
After the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission
landmarked the building and the restaurant’s interior, TIAA
brought suit challenging the designation, alleging, among other
arguments, a per se taking without just compensation. 95

Citing

Shubert, the lower court held that the preservation statute was
immune from per se takings challenges where the claim is based
on a restricted use of property. 96
Once again, the Teachers Insurance court was also faced
with the argument that the designation of the Four Seasons
interior was actually a pretext for impermissibly protecting the

90

Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 39.
Id. at 40.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 39.
94
Rothstein, 26 Conn.L.Rev. at 1124.
95
586 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (1992)
96
Id.
91
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existing use of the space. 97

This court gave no more weight to

the pretext argument than the Shubert court had done.

In

rejecting the claim of pretext, the court reasoned that it does
not follow that just because the space’s optimum use considering
the designation is probably as a restaurant, that the
designation mandates the space’s continued use as such. 98

In

other words, eliminating the most profitable possible uses for
an interior is not the same as requiring one specific use only.
TIAA argued in addition that the designation of the
restaurant’s interior impermissibly included elements that were
not fixtures of the space. 99

The court handily added this to the

list of TIAA’s failed arguments.

It reasoned that the features

in question (sculptures) were sufficiently connected to the
restaurant’s interior to fall within the meaning of the
applicable regulation. 100

The court concluded simply that the

regulation in question “does not distinguish between personalty
and realty.” 101
TIAA appealed the decision of the New York Supreme Court. 102
On appeal before the New York Court of Appeals, TIAA
abandoned any hope of prevailing on constitutional grounds. 103

97

Id. at 264.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 41.
103
Id.
98
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The Association alleged only that the New York preservation
statute gave no authority for interior designations. 104

It seems

apparent that TIAA had read the writing on the wall by this
time: interior designations appear by all accounts invincible to
takings challenges.
Even unencumbered by the constitutional challenge, TIAA
must have realized that its appeal would be an uphill battle;
the New York City Landmarks Law explicitly authorized landmark
designation for interiors older than 30 years. 105

The code does

specify, however, that the space must be open to the public or
be one “customarily open or accessible to the public, or to
which the public is customarily invited.” 106

The argument

against designation centered on the claim that a fundamental
difference exists between the character of truly “public” spaces
like lobbies, theaters, and train stations and “ordinary
commercial space[s].” 107

The difference, TIAA argued, is that

the former are “dedicated to public use.” 108
The court rejected TIAA’s distinction, finding no
difference between the nature of the public’s access to a
restaurant or its access to a theater or any other private space

104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id. § 25-302(a)(2).
New York City, N.Y., Admin. Code § 25-302(m).
Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 42.
Id. at 43.
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which depends on public patronage for its viability. 109 Nor, the
court reasoned, did the Landmark Law itself make any distinction
in the nature of various varieties of interior spaces. 110
TIAA proffered one last-ditch argument against designation.
It argued that even though the space was currently leased by a
restaurant and therefore accessible to the public, it might one
day be adapted to a strictly private purpose. 111

The interior

would become by that token outside the scope of the code which
requires public access for designation to be permissible. 112

The

court recognized that this reasoning taken to its logical
conclusion leads to the absurd result that any interior that
might possibly be converted to a private use in the future can
never be a landmark. 113

United Artists’ (1993)

This case is the reargument of the appeal of Sameric to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 114
In the original appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed the decision below, and held that,

109

Id.
Id.
111
Id. at 44.
112
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
113
Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 44.
114
United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612
(1993).
110
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…the “Historic Buildings, Structures, Sites, Objects
and Districts” provisions of the Philadelphia Code
(Section
14-2007),
which
authorize
the
historic
designation of private property-in this case the Boyd
Theater-without the consent of the owner, are unfair,
unjust and amount to an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation in violation of Article 1,
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 115
Interestingly, the court did not make any distinction
between interior and exterior designation.
entire historic preservation ordinance. 116

It struck down the
One author summarizes

the decision in this way:
There
is
plenty
of
opportunity
for
serious
constitutional discussion of real problems involved in
landmark designation, but not much such discussion in
the
majority
opinion.
Characteristic
of
the
prevailing tone is a heavy reliance on a longdiscredited Pennsylvania (anti-)zoning opinion dating
from 1926.[…] About the closest thing to legal
reasoning in the opinion are two references, just in
passing, to two pro-developer rationales – that a
private owner cannot validly be required to share a
public burden, which should be borne by all taxpayers,
and that the validity of zoning depended on the fact
that
it
involved
“an
average
reciprocity
of
advantage. 117
This was the first time a state court had dismissed Penn
Central to hold that it interpreted takings differently under
the state constitution than under the federal Constitution. 118

115

United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6,
13 (1991).
116
Id. at 14.
117
Williams and Taylor, supra note 16.
118
Daniel T. Cavarello, From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: The Rise
to Immunity of Historic Preservation Designation from Successful Takings
Challenges, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 593, 610 (1995).
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The contention that United Artists’ excited prompted the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to hear reargument of the
constitutional elements of the case. 119
This Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which one author described
as “deeply riven by various internal controversies,” took two
years to issue its opinion on the reargument. 120

Chief Justice

Nix wrote the opinion with which three other judges agreed. 121
One judge reiterated the past decision in a dissent, and two
more did not participate. 122
In this decision, the court held to the Penn Central
precedent and found that the case’s facts did not give rise to a
taking under the federal Constitution. 123
The court’s consideration of the facts under the
Pennsylvania constitution lead it to consider the federal
takings precedent it had rejected on its first hearing of the
case. 124

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the takings

analysis used by federal courts, which it set forth as follows:
1) the interest of the general public, rather than a
particular class of persons, must require governmental
action;
2) the means must be necessary to effectuate that
purpose;
3) the means must not be unduly oppressive upon the
property holder, considering the economic impact of
119
120
121
122
123
124

Williams and Taylor, supra note 16.
Williams and Taylor, supra note 16.
United Artists’ II, 635 A.2d at 614.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 619.
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the regulation, and the extent to which the government
physically intrudes upon the property. 125
Under this analysis, the court found no taking. 126

The

court upheld the power of the Commission to undertake historic
preservation, but only through exterior designation. 127

The

enabling legislation, reasoned the court, specifically referred
to the upkeep and maintenance of landmarks’ exteriors, but only
mentioned the maintenance of interiors insofar as such was
necessary to preserve the structure’s exterior. 128

The

Commission had therefore acted without authority in designating
the Boyd Theater’s interior and the designation was vacated. 129
The major contribution to protecting interior preservation
made by this case lies in its recognition of the Edmunds
principles of federal and state statutory interpretation. 130
Pennsylvania had tried to “make its own way” by interpreting its
own constitutional takings clause outside the prescribed methods
used for federal takings. Until Pennsylvania joined the rest of
the states, it left the possibility open that each state would
be its own “loose cannon,” with its own interpretation of
takings.

This would have rendered interior preservation’s

takings victories in federal court all but useless.

125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 618.
at 620.
at 622.

at 615.
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Pennsylvania’s decision to adopt the standard interpretation
method ensures that the very favorable federal takings doctrine
will be applicable in the states as well.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it seems clear that the field of interior
preservation is riddled with treasures for the academic and
legal mind.

This area too long neglected must reclaim the

attention of legal scholars and practitioners.
Take, for example, the 18th and 19th-century houses of some
of the nation’s oldest historic districts.

The exterior

architectural elements of these buildings are already protected
by landmark designations, although only a few, if any of their
interiors benefit form any kind of legal protection.

How can

historic preservation commissions avoid the reproof this paper
directs at scholars and practitioners for neglecting interior
preservation?

Can they claim that the interior architecture of

the 18th and 19th centuries is of lesser quality than that of
the exterior?

Do the Greek and Roman revival, Neoclassical,

Victorian, Beaux-Arts, Art Nouveau, Art Deco, Modern and
International styles manifest themselves only in exterior
architectural elements?
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Indeed, in D.C., Philadelphia, and New York, as elsewhere,
private homes often hold the best (and best-preserved) examples
of historic architecture.

Why have preservation commissions

failed to protect these invaluable resources?
Perhaps some local commissions still lack the express
authority to make interior landmark designations.

In light of

the many protections surrounding interior preservation, should
local commissions like D.C. and others, whose preservation
statutes include no specific authority to designate interiors
now make the effort to have such terms expressly included?

The

precedent described here will probably keep interior designation
safe from takings attacks, even in localities where there is no
express authority to make them.

However, such cases may give

rise to new due process challenges currently outside interior
preservation’s known territory.
attacks?

What are these potential

Is interior preservation prepared to face them?

And there are other issues, too – does the armor whose
construction has been outlined here provide too much protection
for old buildings and not enough for people?

How might courts

use the existing doctrines of interior preservation to
accomplish even more ambitious preservation goals?

What is the

potential for abuse of this highly protected area of law?
All these and other question wait to be explored in a field
overgrown with exciting and novel issues ripe for examination.
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